Beijing's stalled liberalization is also of a piece with greater industrial-policy intervention, aimed to promote a core of about 50 SOEs, mainly in "strategic" manufacturing and resource-based sectors, and a handful of state-owned banks that dominate the financial system. China's response to the global financial crisis—a supercharged fiscal and monetary stimulus—bolstered the public sector and state power at the expense of the far-less-subsidized private sector. Beijing's frequent recourse to command-and-control mechanisms such as price controls to fight inflation makes market reform harder.
北京自由化进程的停滞不前也与更大力度的工业政策干预有关系,这种干预旨在推动大约由50家国有企业组成的“核心”的发展。这些企业主要属于“战略性”制造业和以资源为基础的部门,此外还有几家主导着金融体系的国有银行。中国应对全球金融危机的方式——动力超强的财政和货币刺激计划——扶持了公共部门和政府的实力,却让私人部门为此付出代价,后者得到的补贴要少得多。北京时常求助于“指令加控制”机制的这种做法,比如利用限价措施来抗击通货膨胀,增加了市场改革的难度。
Protectionist trade policy and dirigiste industrial policy meet at several junctions. Export restrictions—most conspicuously on rare-earth metals—have increased. Tax incentives, subsidies and price controls, as well as administrative "guidance" on investment decisions, are used to favor domestic goods over imports. China-specific standards, such as on third-generation mobile phones, can create high compliance costs for foreign enterprises. Services barriers, notably in financial and telecommunication services, have come down very slowly, if at all.
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