忘记恢复纾困所附带的条款吧。重要的是,要实现上述债务比率目标,经济必须出现明显好转。不幸的是,不管是容克还是其他任何人——遑论希腊政府——都难以推动经济增长。德意志银行(Deutsche Bank)估计,到2014年希腊经济规模将比2010年5月国际货币基金组织(IMF)所预估的小五分之一,那时希腊刚刚获得第一次救助。
The inevitability of this week’s agreement is priced in – the Greek 10-year bond yield has fallen by about a third since August. Greek bank shares fell 10 per cent yesterday, however. That sector may be the biggest casualty of the train wreck. Its enforced restructuring to create three main banking groups – which should be a positive signal to investors – has instead become an indicator of increased convertibility risk: nobody wants to buy Greek assets as long as an exit from the euro is even remotely possible.
市场早就对达成本次协议的必然性做出了反应。自8月以来,希腊10年期债券收益率跌了约三分之一。昨天希腊银行股板块跌了10%。银行业可能是最大的受害者。希腊银行业被迫重组,形成了三大银行集团,这对投资者而言应该是个利好,但从中也折射出兑换性风险(convertibility risk)升高:只要希腊还有一丝退出欧元区的可能性,就没有人愿意购买希腊资产。
Arguably, the deal represents the moment at which its eurozone partners went so far down the road with Greece that it will be easier to keep going than to turn back. Even that, however, does not reduce the likelihood that creditors will have to write off more – perhaps all – of their Greek debt. Even if the 124 per cent debt ratio is achieved, only a country with a growing economy can possibly claim to be solvent at that level. Greece, alas, is very far from solvency at any level.
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