In all versions of the game, roughly 60% of players started out co-operating. However, in thefirst two, this decreased over time as the pernicious influence of the freeloaders spread. Thelarger the fraction of a subjects partners who defected in a given round, the less likely thatperson was to co-operate in the nextclassical tit-for-tat. However, this tit-for-tat retaliationwas not enough to save co-operation, and after a dozen rounds only 10-20% of the playerswere still willing to co-operate.
在游戏的三种模式中,大约有60%的参与者起初都愿意表现合作精神。不过在前两种形式中,合作者的数目随着不劳而获者不断散播的消极影响,而逐渐减少。在特定的游戏中,调查对象的合作者中如果存在越多的人扮演叛逃者,该对象在下一轮游戏中就越不愿意表现合作精神这正是典型的投桃报李精神。不过这种投桃报李的回馈态度无法维持合作关系,在大约12轮游戏后,只有大约10-20%的参与者仍然愿意表现合作精神。
In the variant where participants had some choice over whom they interacted with, though, theamount of co-operation stayed stable as the rounds progressed. When Dr Christakis and histeam looked at how the relationships between players were evolving in this third version, theyfound that connections between two co-operators were much more likely to be maintained thanlinks that involved a defector. Over time, the co-operators accumulated more social connectionsthan the defectors did.
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