Furthermore, the US does not have convincing reasons to pursue its Indo-Pacific strategy. Mattis repeatedly mentioned the militarization of the South China Sea islands in his speech as a reason for the need to contain China, even as all countries with claims in the South China Sea remained silent about it. When the Obama administration started to pursue the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, it also used the South China Sea as an excuse to sow discord and raise regional tensions. Now, it's completely different. Tensions relating to the South China Sea have been eased, calm has returned to the region, a trend of positive development has emerged, and all parties concerned have returned to the correct track of settling disputes: through consultation and negotiation. The US attempted to rope Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia into its Indo-Pacific strategy, but few responded positively. Interestingly, the US, Japan, Australia, and India all stressed that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations play the central role in effectuating the Indo-Pacific strategy, but ASEAN has never actively supported it. The main reason behind this is the waning creditability and leadership of the Trump administration.
更重要的是,“美国优先”增加了美“印太战略”实行的不确定性。特朗普执政的主基调是,在“美国优先”原则下,聚焦美国遭受不公正待遇,被别国占了便宜,要大幅度提升盟国军费份额;不分亲疏征收高额关税;就伊核问题和采购俄制武器实施“二级制裁”等。“美国优先”不但令世界很受伤,也让印太盟国和伙伴国忧心忡忡。这从根本上搅乱了美国“印太战略”部署,使其陷入了起步难的困境。
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