In such an environment, financial institutions need to signal credibly to the market that they are law compliant. No rational manager tolerates misconduct when the expected costs exceed the expected benefits. But avoiding cost-inefficient misconduct alone is not enough. The signal must be clear: involvement in misconduct must be career-ending, even for those who only failed to supervise adequately. For large financial institutions who have evaded the sunlight of disclosure (often with regulatory acquiescence), the transition will be difficult.
在这种环境下,金融机构需要向市场发出一个可信的信号:它们是遵循法律的。没有一个理性的高管能容忍代价高于收益的不当行为。但仅仅避免没有经济效益的不当行为还是不够的。必须明确:参与不当行为就必然意味着终结职业生涯,即使对于那些只是没能恰当履行监督职责的人来说也是如此。对于那些逃避信息披露(往往有着监管默许)的大型金融机构来说,这种过渡将是比较困难的。
In the UK, the same bottom line follows: as the public has become suspicious of large banks, reputation becomes critical, both as the glue that holds together organisational culture and as the deciding factor in enforcement negotiations.
英国应该有着同样的底线:公众对大型银行越来越不信任,因而声誉就显得非常关键,它既是凝聚机构文化的“胶水,也是执法协商中的决定性因素。
【声誉是银行的“硬通货”】相关文章:
★ 学礼仪 迎奥运
最新
2020-09-15
2020-09-15
2020-09-15
2020-09-15
2020-09-15
2020-09-15