抛开投资本金和风险本身与金融危机并无关系这一事实,也不讨论高盛押宝抵押贷款市场崩溃(这一行为使公司逃过一劫)——这些新的监管措施将限制华尔街的收益和获利能力,在商业环境本已如此萧条的背景下,这无疑是雪上加霜。(制造,包装,销售风险日益上升的住房抵押贷款产品以及其他债务证券产品的传统业务,是华尔街在2008年遭受重创的原因。)
Not being able to make those big proprietary bets when you see them developing — in effect, the closing of the casino that Wall Street has become over the past few decades — will severely limit bankers' money-making opportunities. It will also protect the rest of us when those big bets go wrong or are perceived to be too risky. (For every Goldman Sachs acting brilliantly, there is an MF Global Holdings acting foolishly).
即便发现投资机会,投行也不能激进下注——过去几十年间造就的华尔街赌场,如今一朝关闭——这一事实会大大减少银行家的获利机会。同时,这些限制错误投资或风险过大投资的监管措施,其实也是对我们大多数人的保护。(高盛每走一步好棋,全球曼氏金融就会走一步臭棋。)
There is little debate anymore that Wall Street had become highly dependent on its trading operations. Something like 90 percent of Bear Stearns's profits in the years leading up to its March 2008 demise came from its trading and debt-origination activities. At Goldman Sachs in 2010, its traditional investment-banking operations generated only $1.3 billion of $12.9 billion in pretax earnings, about 10 percent.
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