类似的紧张气氛盛行于华尔街。美林证券和AIG的高管们早在2005年、2006年时就已经开始担心公司涉足抵押贷款市场将会带来隐忧。公司内部预见到这种噩运的预言家们被置之不理,得不到重视,甚至被炒了鱿鱼,原因却不是因为老板贪污受贿,而是因为他们根本就不相信这些警告。AIG声名狼藉的金融产品部主管乔-卡萨诺脾气暴躁,当时他确实对信用损失的状况不太放心,但却没有考虑过可能产生巨量的复合抵押品要求,而这却最终导致该公司的崩溃。美林证券的头儿斯坦奥尼尔把本可能规劝警告他的人都打入冷宫,因此根本没有意识到公司已经累积了致命数额的次级贷。而高盛之所以能够逃脱这些公司的噩运,很大程度上是因为其高管听进去了逆耳的忠言。
Much of the history that Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera recount has already appeared innews accounts, books, government investigations and court proceedings. Still, they havesynthesised an impressive amount of that material and supplemented it with their ownreporting to produce a comprehensive and authoritative account. Lesser-known eventsand individuals take on new prominence, such as the 1986 tax law that made it possible toslice up mortgage-backed securities, and the important role played by Ameriquest and itspolitically deft founder, Roland Arnall, in leading the race to the bottom in subprimestandards.
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