这种有限责任公司的观念在19世纪是合理的,当时资本短缺,而劳动力廉价而且充足。突显这一现实的是,当时雇主将员工称为“人手”,这种语言上的简化反映出那时的劳资关系状况。
The 19th century company law framework allowed the shareholder-capitalist to exercise exclusively the control rights over the business. Shareholders could vote at the annual general meeting on issues such as the election of directors, while other stakeholders could not. Whether this is appropriate today when the world is awash with savings and finance capital is abundant — witness low or negative real interest rates in global bond markets — is moot. The real driver of high growth in the economy is increasingly human capital.
19世纪的公司法律框架允许股东-资本家对企业独家行使控制权。股东可以就董事选举等问题在年度股东大会上投票,而其他利益相关者不能。至于在如今全球储蓄充裕和金融资本富足(看看全球债券市场极低或处于负数区间的实际利率吧)的情况下,这种模式还是否合理,那是一个悬而未决的问题。但是人力资本日趋成为真正推动经济高增长的因素。
These highly skilled people are at much greater risk from the bankruptcy of their employer than the fund managers or pension fund beneficiaries who hold investments in the company as part of widely diversified portfolios. Yet pension fund trustees or professional fund managers, who tend to take a narrowly financial view of corporate performance, still retain the control rights in most quoted companies.
【股东vs管理层:公司治理谁说了算?】相关文章:
最新
2019-01-07
2019-01-07
2019-01-07
2019-01-07
2019-01-07
2019-01-05