In 2016 these investors voted 90.3 per cent in line with ISS and 83.2 per cent in line with Glass Lewis on all recommendations. Yet on contentious votes such as boardroom pay the respective percentages dropped to 51.4 per cent and 29.5 per cent. In other words, the fund managers supported company boards against the advice of ISS and especially Glass Lewis, which is more aggressive on egregious pay awards. It is no coincidence that many fund managers have been attacked by proxy advisers for their own executive pay arrangements.
2016年,这些投资者的投票有90.3%与ISS的建议相符,有83.2%与Glass Lewis的建议相符。然而,在董事会薪资等备受争议的投票上,两者的比例分别降至51.4%和29.5%。换句话说,相对于ISS的建议,基金经理更支持公司董事会,忽视了ISS和Glass Lewis(特别是后者)的建议,这两大代理顾问对过分的薪酬态度更严厉。并非巧合的是,很多基金管理公司本身的高管薪资安排也受到代理顾问的抨击。
Restoring oversight
恢复监督
All of this points to a growing governance vacuum. The resulting weakness in accountability is exacerbated by the growth of public sector investors such as sovereign wealth funds. With the notable exception of Norway’s fund, the world’s biggest, these secretive institutions are often reluctant to engage with companies in foreign jurisdictions because they fear being accused of meddling in other countries’ affairs.
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