过去半个世纪,在总部设在巴黎、主要由富国组成的经合组织(OECD)多数市场上市的公司,在所有权结构上已从直接所有转向专业资产管理公司的中间所有。例如,在英国,在截至2017年的50年里,个人直接持有的上市公司股份已从50%以上降至不到12%。在美国,直接所有的比重已从84%降至37%。
As Mats Isaksson and Serdar Celik of the OECD have pointed out, the great majority of intermediary investors lack the financial incentive to monitor and engage with managers. There is also a principal-agent problem: agents acting for pension scheme members are reluctant to engage in activism in relation to companies from whom they hope to win or retain pension fund mandates. At the same time newer types of investors, such as high-frequency traders and hedge fund short sellers, have no interest in exercising ownership rights.
正如经合组织的马茨?伊萨克森(Mats Isaksson)和塞尔达尔?塞利克(Serdar Celik)所指出的,绝大多数中间投资者缺乏监督和接触管理者的财务激励。这里还存在一个委托代理关系的问题:代表养老金计划成员的代理,不愿投入与他们希望赢得或保留养老基金投资委托的公司相关的维权活动。与此同时,高频交易员和对冲基金卖空者等较新型投资者对于行使所有权毫无兴趣。
The difficulties of engaging are particularly acute for the growing band of passive investors, such as index tracking funds and exchange traded funds that own baskets of shares, bonds or commodities that are traded on exchanges. They operate in highly competitive, low-margin markets. Because of the cost of collecting and analysing information and engaging with management at large numbers of companies, many professional investors rely on the recommendations of proxy advisers.
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