对于数量日益增多的被动投资者(例如指数跟踪基金和拥有一篮子在交易所交易的股票、债券或大宗商品的交易所交易基金(ETF))而言,接触公司管理层的难度尤其大。它们在竞争激烈、利润率较低的市场运作。由于收集和分析信息以及接触公司管理层的成本高昂,很多专业投资者依赖代理顾问的建议。
“The business model and governance approach of many passive investors look incompatible with the growing expectation on institutional investors to act as active, well-informed owners,” says Simon Wong, a leading corporate governance expert at Northwestern University School of Law in Chicago.
芝加哥西北大学法学院(Northwestern University School of Law)领先的公司治理专家Simon Wong表示:“很多被动投资者的业务模式和治理方法,看上去与外界日益期望机构投资者充当活跃、了解情况的所有者不符。”
The exception to the rule of slavish adherence to the proxy advisers’ recommendations relates to conflicts of interest. Proxy Insight, a company that monitors the voting behaviour of investors, has examined voting by the top 10 global institutional investors and looked at the correlation with the recommendations of ISS and Glass Lewis, the two biggest proxy advisers.
不听从代理顾问建议的例外情况涉及利益冲突。监督投资者投票行为的Proxy Insight考察了全球10大机构投资者的投票行为,研究它们与两大代理顾问——机构股东服务(ISS)和Glass Lewis——建议的相关性。
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