Today’s corporate governance agenda in the Anglosphere and Japan is heavily oriented towards stewardship by institutional investors. Yet insurance companies and pension funds — the natural long-term potential stewards — have been retreating from the equity market while less governance-minded institutions such as public sector funds and passive funds take over. The Office for National Statistics said British insurers and pension funds owned 8.9 per cent of the domestic equity market in 2017 compared with 43.3 per cent in 1998.
如今,英语国家和日本的公司治理议程大大侧重于机构投资者的看管。然而,天然的长期潜在管家——保险公司和养老基金——正从股市退却,公共部门基金和被动型基金等治理意识较弱的机构正在补位。英国国家统计局(ONS)称,2017年,英国保险公司和养老基金占国内股市的8.9%,而1998年为43.3%。
This dwindling rump of conventional institutional investors is, in effect, acting as a Platonic guardian of the corporate sector while lacking the Greek philosopher’s wisdom — witness their inability to address the excesses of boardroom pay and their shortcomings before the financial crisis, where they connived in excessive risk-taking and failed to constrain chief executives at failing banks, most notably Dick Fuld of Lehman Brothers and Fred Goodwin of RBS.
实际上,这些日渐式微的传统机构投资者正成为企业界的“柏拉图”式守护者,只是缺乏这位希腊哲学家的智慧,看看他们无力解决董事会薪资过高的问题,以及金融危机之前的缺陷吧,那时他们默许了过度的冒险行为,而且未能制约一些失败银行的首席执行官,最引人注目的是雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)的迪克?富尔德(Dick Fuld)和苏格兰皇家银行(RBS)的弗雷德?古德温(Fred Goodwin)。
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