理由之一是中国外汇储备在央行和私营部门之间的转移。直到不久以前,中国央行持有中国几乎所有外汇作为官方储备,而银行、企业和家庭持有极少外汇。
This was due largely to the central bank’s intervention in the foreign exchange market. At itspeak, the PBoC purchased hundreds of millions of dollars a month in order to restrain renminbiappreciation. Chinese banks and companies, for their part, were happy to fob off their dollarson to the PBoC, since they stood to profit from the slow but steady renminbi appreciationbetween 2005 and 2013.
这在很大程度上是由于央行干预汇市。在干预力度最大的时期,央行为了抑制人民币升值每月买入数亿美元。而中国的银行和企业乐意把美元交给央行,因为在2005年至2013年期间他们获利于缓慢但稳定的人民币升值。
That changed last year, when the renminbi suffered its first significant full-year depreciation inmore than 20 years. Now many Chinese exporters who receive payments in dollars simply holdthem, rather than buying local currency. Though these dollars no longer swell the centralbank’s coffers, the money remains inside China and so should not be viewed as “outflows,economists say.
这种情况在去年发生变化;去年人民币出现逾20年来首次显著的全年贬值。如今,很多收到美元付款的中国出口企业选择持有美元,而不是兑换成人民币。经济学家们表示,虽然这些美元不再扩大央行的金库,但这笔钱仍然在中国境内,因此不应被视为“流出。
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