它们还利用监管结构中的漏洞,创造了政策制定者不易监管或控制的产品(抵押贷款衍生品由谁监管在那时并不明确)。
A sense of fragmentation is hampering policymakers again. And as Kara Stein, a commissionerat the US Securities and Exchange Commission, has observed: “We can’t afford a fragmentedregulatory architecture.
一种分散的感觉再次困扰政策制定者。正如美国证交会(SEC)委员卡拉斯坦(Kara Stein)所说的:“我们负担不起一个支离破碎的监管体系的后果。
It is unclear whether the regulators’ remit covers all the upstarts.
现在尚不清楚监管部门的职责范围是否覆盖所有新平台。
Perhaps this does not matter. The P2P sector is a tiddler compared to the overall financialworld (or the pile of mortgage derivatives which sowed havoc in 2008). And unlike the pensionfunds which were exposed to mortgage-backed securities in 2006, for example, the banksand hedge funds understand the dangers of credit losses. So even if P2P loans turn bad inthe future, this should not pose wider risks.
也许这并不重要。与整个金融世界(或者引发2008年灾难的抵押贷款衍生品的规模)相比,P2P行业就像一条小鱼。比如,与在2006年存在抵押贷款支持证券相关敞口的养老基金不同,银行和对冲基金知道信贷损失的危险。因此,即使P2P贷款在未来变成坏账,也不会构成更大范围的风险。
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