在银行业,IFRS尤为有害。在此次金融危机之前,根据该准则,银行被禁止为预期的贷款损失进行拨备。它们反而被要求实行“已发生的贷款损失拨备模式,只允许为已经变为坏账的贷款做出拨备。根据该准则,因为对于风险较高的贷款来说所需支付的利息也会更高,所以银行能够在不考虑预期违约成本的情况下提前“实现更高的利润率。实际上,银行的会计报表未能就其财务健康状况提供“真实且公允意见。
Meanwhile, banking executives, whose bonuses are often tied to short-term profits, were incentivised to expand lending rapidly, often lending of the riskier variety. Mark-to-market (and mark-to-model) valuations of bank trading books, unconstrained by a high level requirement for prudence, added fuel to the fire.
与此同时,奖金往往与短期利润挂钩的银行业高管有动机迅速扩大贷款投放,而且通常是风险较高的贷款类别。根据按市值计价(Mark-to-market)——以及按模型计价(Mark to Model)——的方法对银行交易账簿进行估值,在不受高度审慎原则约束的情况下,让问题变得更加严重。
In principle, the banks’ auditors should have been able to override accounts that failed to deliver a true and fair view. In practice, the emphasis on compliance with IFRS has deterred company directors and auditors from using their professional judgment to invoke the “true and fair override. This has been exacerbated by structural failures in the audit market that have undermined auditors’ independence and their willingness to challenge company executives.
【欧洲应重新审视会计准则】相关文章:
最新
2020-09-15
2020-09-15
2020-09-15
2020-09-15
2020-09-15
2020-09-15