不过,欧洲央行不会无条件介入,而是只有在相关国家满足特定条件时才会介入。具体条件并非由欧洲央行设定。德拉吉说,这些条件的具体性质将由各国政府、欧盟、欧盟委员会和IMF决定。但欧洲央行要求,一旦达成一致,这些条件需要得到尊重。
Such conditionality is perfectly understandable. But it must militate against the goals of the new programme. The ECB is saying that it will seek to eliminate the threat of a break-up, except when this threat is most real, which is. of course, precisely when the country is failing to meet policy conditions. Investors know that electorates might choose a government that has no intention of sticking to agreed conditions. What happens then? The answer is: either the ECB stops buying, in which case the bond market implodes, or the ECB continues, in which case conditionality is jettisoned.
这种条件性完全可以理解,却必然会妨碍新计划实现目标。欧洲央行宣称将试图消除解体的威胁,但威胁最迫切的时候(恰恰是相关国家满足不了政策条件的时候)除外。投资者明白,选民可能会选择无意遵守约定条件的政府。然后会怎么样?答案是:欧洲央行要么停止购买计划,放任债券市场崩溃;要么放弃条件,继续购债。
This latter possibility seems the more likely: it will be hard for the ECB to stop. But that, too, might have dire consequences. Spurred on by opposition to this scheme from the Bundesbank, postwar Germany’s most respected institution, swathes of German opinion hate what is happening to their money, as my colleague, Wolfgang Munchau, explained in a recent column. It is easy to imagine what would happen within Germany if an important member country started to backslide on agreed policy conditions, while the ECB went on buying its bonds. The swelling rage would hardly strengthen confidence in the irreversibility of the euro. Nobody could be sure how German politicians would choose to respond – or be allowed to respond. At present, the government is quite supportive of the ECB. But that would surely not endure under all circumstances.
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